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STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs believe that the issues are fairly raised by 
defendants' "Statement of Points on Appeal" (Brief, 
page 8) and Wft shall meet those points in the order pre-
sented in defendants' argument. 
We do not subscribe to defendants' "Statement of 
the Case" (Brief, pages 1-8) nor to their analysis of rele-
vant statutes and decisions. 
In so far as the facts are concerned defendants write 
as though the trial judge had not disbelieved them on 
crucial disputed testimony and had not found in plain-
tiffs' favor on plaintiffs' undisputed testimony. In so far 
as the law is concerned defendants write as though dur-
ing the past decade no statutes had been enacted (Utah 
Righ't to Work law of 1955), regulations promulgated 
(N. l. R. B. "jurisdictional yardstick" regulations of 1954, 
infra), or decisions enunciated (inter alia, the Hanke case 
of 1950, anc;J other "post-Taft-Hartley" decisions, infra). 
In the course of our documenting the record which 
sustains the decision of the court on the particular matters 
raised by defendants in their "Statement of the Facts" 
we shall also answer the one or two law points urged by 
defendants in their "Statement of Facts." 
Defendants are highly critical of the trial court's 
having believed and accepted the testimony of plaintiffs' 
witnesses, but fail to recognize the nature and import of 
the evidence that prompted the trial court to find find the 
truth on the side of the plaintiffs. For example the attitude 
of Walter Odendahl, a man of many years experience in 
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all departments of coal mine operation (137), was not 
one of antagonism to unions in general, or the United 
Mine Workers of America in particular, but his financial 
inability to meet the terms of a United Mine Workers con-
tract (125, 142, 146, 147, 149, 153, 158, 164, 187, 188, 
337). That was the reason Odendahl shut down the mine, 
and it is the prerogative and constitutional righ·t of any 
business man, with or without reason, to continue or dis-
continue in business as he sees fit; and no one is privileg-
ed to complain even though he does it deliberately to 
avoid a labor dispute. (Tarr v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of 
Street Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America, 
Division 1055 et al (Idaho 1952), 250 P. 2d 904). The 
trial court recognized this right of one to dispose of his 
property and go out of business (139). 
Defendants assert that there is evidence that Walter 
Odendahl coerced three employees into terminating their 
emF)Ioyment, and cites the testimony of the defendant Pe-
corelli as to what he was supposedly told by Reboil Motte 
and the defendants Claron Golding and Faye Gene Ol-
sen. The defendants Claron Golding and Faye Gene Ol-
sen, who appeared in this cause as witnesses, did not 
corroborate the testimony of Pecorelli. Mr. Reboil Motte 
was never called as a witness. Those three employess of 
Odendahl voluntarily severed their employment with the 
Star Point Coal Co. (Exhibit E), under the circumstances as 
stated by Odendahl (144). 
Defendants refer to what they designate as a "so-
called partnership" among the plaintiffs (Exhibit D), and 
state that the question arises as to whether the lease from 
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Odendahl to the partnership was bona fide or sham. 
There is no evidence in the record to controvert the exis-
tence of the partnership, or establish that the lease was 
not bona fide. Counsel for ·the defendants admitted, un-
der the questioning of the trial court, that defendants had 
nothing to show that the lease was merely a front (140), 
and ·the trial court found the partnership and lease to be 
bona fide, and "that in this good old U.S.A." the parties 
had a right to enter into such relationship and plan of 
operation (299). 
rhat the plaintiff partnership, under an arrange-
ment as found by the trial court that obviated the neces-
sity of their having employees (299), could not accept the 
usual contract of the United Mine Workers of America 
embodying terms of seniority of employment, and re-
quiring the re-employment of all former employees of 
Walter Odendahl, is self-evident (129; 134; 135). 
At this point it is appropriate to call attention to the 
fact that defendants apparently have lost sight of their 
antagonist. It is the plaintiffs with whom defendan·ts have 
their quarrel. The plaintiffs have no employees - they 
need none and want none. Odendahls who formerly 
operated the mine with employees are no longer involv-
ed. For defendants to narrate the circumstances and ar-
gue the law as though the case were against Odendahls 
is to miss the point entirely. 
Defendants indicate that the ex-parte restraining or-
der granted by the trial court was unlawful because of 
non compliance with Sec. 34-1-28 U.C.A. 1953. The 
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Utah Right to Work Law, 34-16-1 to 18, while no.t ex-
pressly negativing the application of the Labor Disputes 
Act, Title 34, Chap. 1, U.C.A. 1953, is the la.test expres-
sion of the legislature, and is controlling as to iniunctive 
relief under that Law; and if there is any conflict between 
the two acts, the Right to Work Law supercedes the con-
flicting portion of the Labor Disputes Act. Hanson v. lnter-
natoinal Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 406, 79 
So. 2d 199, (1955); 82 C.J.S., 489, Sec. 291; Bullen v. 
Anderson, 81 Utah 151, 27 P. 2d 213. 
Defendants contend that ·the plaintiffs, by taking 
over the mine, assumed the alleged labor dispute be-
tween Odendahl and ,the United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica As has heretofore been stated, it was Odendahl's pre-
rogative and constitutional right to discontinue his busi-
ness; the trial court recognized that right (139); counsel 
for the defendants admitted that defendants had nothing 
to show that the lease was merely a fron1t (140); and the 
trial court found the partnership and lease to be bona 
fide (299). Under such circumstances, a successor cannot 
be made to bear the burden of his predecessor's unfair 
labor practices, if any existed. (Tarr v. Amalgamated 
Ass'n. of Street Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of 
America, Division 1055 et al, supra}. The cases cited by 
defendants in support of their position to the contrary 
(Brief, page 4), National Labor Relations Board vs. New 
Madrid Manufacturing Co., 215 F (2d) 908; Regal Knit-
wear Co. vs. N.L.R.B. 324 U. S. 9, 65 S. Ct. 478; N.L.R.B. 
vs. Atkins, 67 S Ct. 1265, 331 U. S. 398) simply do not 
sustain any such proposition, as a reading of those parti-
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cular cases will demonstrate clearly. 
Defendants next contend that there 1s a labor dis-
pute existing in this case pursuant to Sec. 34-1-34, U.C.A. 
1953, while the definitions controlling the interpretation 
of the Labor Disputes Act provide: 
34-1-2 Definitions - When used in this act: 
(9} The term "labor dispute" means any con-
troversy between an employer and the majority 
of his employees in a collective bargaining unit 
concerning the right or process or details of col-
lective bargaining or the designation of represen-
tatives. 
No "labor dispute,. can exist under that definition, be-
cause the plaintiffs have no employees (206}. 
The evidence is in conflict as to the purpose of the 
picketing, and who was being picketed (204}. The trial 
court found upon substantial evidence that the picketing 
was coercive (284, 252}, enmeshed with violence, ac-
companied by threats (227, 228, 229, 254-55}, and for 
an unlawful purpose. The picketing was coercive in that 
it was conducted on a highway travelled by scarcely any-
one other than the plaintiffs and the independent truckers 
hauling coal from the mine to the railroad. The evidence 
shows that the picketing could not, and did not, acquaint 
the public and the people who travelled along said high-
way that there was an alleged labor dispute. (325-27) 
Picketing under such existing cercumstances is not the ex-
ercise of free speech, it is coercion. Vogt, Inc., a Wiscon-
sin corporation, Respondent, vs. International Brother-
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hood of Teamsters, Local 695, et al. (Wise. 1956), 74 N. 
w. 2d 749. 
The picketing was enmeshed in violence-the blow-
ing up of a bridge and the spreading of roofing nails on 
the only road to plaintiffs' mine. While there is no direct 
proof as to who was responsible for that destructive con-
duct, it is observed that the evidence shows that on the 
morning following the damage to the bridge and the 
spreading of the nails, ·the trucker Mr. Steineger was not 
stopped or hailed as he approached the picket 'line- the 
pickets just waved at him as he went through "over the 
nails" (219) ,and when he got as far as the bridge he 
found it was "blowed up"; whereas on the other occasion 
he was stopped at the line by the pickets. Within one 
week after Mr. Steineger testified, and after the trial 
court granted a temporary injunction, the defendant Faye 
Olsen shot into the radiator of Mr. Steineger's truck 
and into 'the truck of the plaintiff Randall. 
The picketing was accompanied by threatening lan-
guage as found by the trial court, and was for the unlaw-
ful purpose of denying and abridging the right of the 
plaintiffs to work on account of their non-membership in 
a labor union. 
Defendants complain because the trial court found 
Pecorelli and Sacco were implicated in the picketing. Yet 
the defendant Pecorelli, an executive board member of 
the United Mine Workers of America, whose assignment 
is the organization of non-union mines (177), told defen-
dant Claron Golding to "put a picket line up there" (238-
39); received the reports of the pickets from day to day; 
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informed the local unions that he visited regarding the 
picket line; and thereby stimulated the picketing as ad-
mitted by his counsel (190). Defendant Frank Sacco, vice-
president of District 22 of the United Mine Workers of 
America, also reported to ·the local unions that he at-
tended on the progress of the picketing (258) and in-
structed the pickets (257). 
The trial court was privileged to observe the witnes-
ses, their candor, demeanor and fairness. For defendants 
to argue that there was "ample evidence" or "evidence 
to the effect" (Brief, page 6) that their testimony might 
have been accepted by the trial court, is again to miss the 
point. The court upon a satisfactory record believed the 
plain'tiffs and disbelieved defendants. The record fully 
justifies the inferences and conclusions reached, and the 
issuance of a permanent injunction. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN 
INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE REGARDLESS OF THE FEDER-
AL LAW. 
A state court has jurisdiction in labor cases involv-
ing interstate commerce, notwithstanding the provisions 
of the Federal Labor Relations Management Act (herein-
after referred to as l.M.R.A.) when either of the following 
situations· prevail: 
(1) Whenever the picketing or labor dispute involves 
or results in violation of local matters of public safety and 
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order such as violence, threats, blocking of highways or 
violation of declared public policy; or 
(2} Whenever the National Labor Relations Board 
(hereinafter referred to as N.l.R.B.} under its "yardstick" 
jurisdiction promulgation of 1954 refuses to take jurisdic-
tion. 
The law supporting situation (1} is well established. 
State jurisdic,tion has always existed in cases involving 
threats ,obstructing highways and local matters of public 
s·afety and order, such as was found in the instant case 
enmeshed with coercion, vio'lence, and the viola,tion of 
the declared public policy of the State of Utah as expres-
sed by its legislature in the Utah Right to Work law. The 
law was reaffirmed as recently as June 4, 1956 by ,the 
United States Supreme Court in United Automobile, Air-
craft and Agricultural Implement Workers vs. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board 351 U. S. 266, 76 S. Ct. 
794, in the following language: 
There is no reason to re-examine the opinions 
in which this Court has dealt with problems in-
volving federal-state jurisdiction over industrial 
controversies. They have been adequately sum-
marized in Weber vs. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 348 
U.S. 468, 474-477, 75 S. Ct. 480, 484-486, 99 
L. ed. 546. As a general matter we have held that 
a State may no't, in the furtherance of its public 
policy, enjoin conduct "which has been made an 
'unfair labor practice' under the federal statutes." 
ld. 348 U.S. at p. 475, 75 S. Ct. at page 485 and 
cases cited. But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions 
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have made it clear that this general rule does not 
take from the States power to prevent mass pick-
eting, violence, and overt threats of violence. The 
dominant interest of the State in preventing vio-
lence and property damage cannot be question-
ed. It is a matter of genuine local concern. Nor 
should the fact that a union commits a federal un-
fair labor practice while engaging in violent con-
duct prevent States from taking steps to stop the 
violence. 
The States are the natural guardians of the 
public against violence. It is the local commun-
ities that suffer most from the fear and loss oc-
casioned by coercion and destruction .. We would 
not interpret an Act of Congress to leave them 
powerless to avert such emergencies without com-
pelling directions to that effect. 
To further emphasize the significance of this decision 
we quote from the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas: 
We disallowed that duplication of remedy in 
Garner vs. Teamsters etc. Union 346 U. S. 485, 
74 S. Ct. 161, 98 l. Ed. 228. Today we depart 
from Garner and allow a state board to enjoin 
action which is subject to an unfair labor proceed-
ing before the federal board. 
The law supporting situation (2) is likewise impres-
sive. To merely state the query is to supply the answer: 
Conceding federal jurisdiction to exist, if the federal gov-
ernment (N.l.R.B.) refuses to exercise jurisdiction in a 
10 
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labor dispute shall the parties then be left to "the law of 
the jungle" because of alleged lack of jurisdiction by the 
state courts? 
One of the most recent well-reasoned cases sup-
porting the position taken with respect to point (2) is that 
of Lee Mark Metal Manufacturing Company vs. Local No. 
596, 30 Labor Cases 69,968 (Pennsylvania, May 15, 
1956) wherein it was held that state jurisdiction was pro-
per in a case affecting interstate commerce where the 
N.l.R.B refused to exercise its jurisdiction. 
In the case now on appeal the mere fact that 40 
per cent of the output of the plaintiffs' coal mine, while 
being operated by Mr. Odendahl, found its way into in-
terstate commerce, does not per se compel Federa·l juris-
diction or the operation of the L.M.R.A., and exclude state 
jurisdiction. The L.M.R.A. is the only federal legislation 
having pertinence to the issues involved in this case, and 
accordingly Federal jurisdiction in this case must either 
find its source in that act or it does not apply art a'll. The 
burden of the L.M.R.A. is to invest the National Labor Re-
lations Board with the administration and enforcement of 
the provisions of the act in cases embraced by the act. It 
is impor'tant to note that it is settled law that the N.L.R.B. 
has the right and is empowered to prescribe the condi-
tions upon which it will entertain jurisdiction of cases. 
N.L.R.B. vs. Swinerton and Walberg Company, 202 Fed-
eral 2d 511. 
11 
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Prior to 1954, the N.L.R.B. apparently accepted and 
rejected cases on a case-to-case basis, governing itself 
according to the volume and extent of interstate commer-
ce involved, the applicability or non-applicability of the 
'de minimus' doctrine, and kindred considerations. On 
July 1 and 15, 1954, however, t'he N.L.R.B., to remedy 
this variable pattern of operation, promulgated a series 
of dollar-volume standards as a 'yardstick' for determin-
ing if it would or would not invoke its jurisdiction in a giv-
en case. See: Commerce Clearing House Labor Law Re-
porter Vol 1, p. 1611, Sec. 161 0. Cases which do not con-
form to the minimum standards of the board's 'yardstick' 
are no.t and will not be entertained or processed by the 
board, notwithstanding that some interstate commerce is 
involved. Inasmuch as the N.L.R.B. is constituted the sole 
agency for the administration and enforcement of the act, 
which, as has been previously noted, is the sole and only 
es.tablishment of Federal jurisdiction in the premises such 
as are here concerned, the promulgation by the board of 
this jurisdictional 'yardstick' has created what has been 
called a 'penumbral area' between Federal and State 
jurisdiction. Thus it may be seen that the mere presence 
of interstate commerce does not of itself give rise to the 
applicability of the L.M.R.A. with the consequent envel-
opment of the cause by Federal jurisdiction. 
Conformity with the board's jurisdictional 'yardstick' 
must be shown in addition to the proof of involvement 
of interstate commerce before the l.M.R.A. or Federal 
jurisdiction thereunder may be invoked. There was no 
such showing in this case. The only factor in the record 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is that approximately 40 per cent of the output of the 
coal mine involved herein, under the operation of Oden-
dahl, found its way into interstate commerce, and there 
is no evidence whatsoever of the necessary 'yardstick' 
qualifications of an actionable cause before the N.L.R.B. 
Evidence was offered in the case at bar to show that a 
charge was filed against Odendahl by some of his form-
er employees with the N.l.R.B. (329-30), and that the 
N.L.R.B. refused to exercise jurisdiction inasmuch as the 
operations of the company involved were found predom-
inan1tly local in charaCter, and it did not appear that it 
would effectuate the policies of the National Labor Re-
lations Act to exercise jurisdiction. In the Garner and We-
ber cases (Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S. 
Ct. 161 and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348, U. S. 
468) jurisdiction was expressly predicated on the pre-
sence of a cause which was cognizable by the N.L.R.B., 
and in the instant matter the absence of such a cause, 
subject to the consideration of burden of proof, renders 
those cases inapplicable. It is furfher noted that both the 
Garner and Weber cases originated prior to the promul-
gation by the N.l.R.B. of its 'yardstick' policy. 
The defendants had the burden of proof of estab-
lishing the necessary facts to disprove the jurisdiction of 
the trial court to act in the premises. Where one seeks to 
oust a state court from jurisdiction in an injunction pro-
ceeding in a labor dispute on the grounds of conflict of 
jurisdiction, that person assumes and must bear the bur-
den of proving such commerce as will invoke Federal jur-
isdiction. The defendants in this case failed to prove that 
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their cause fell within the board's jurisdictional 'yard-
stick' and therefore their contention of conflict of juris-
diction does not have any validi,ty. In the Garner case it-
seJf 346 U. S. at page 488 the court clearly implied that 
the absence of an actionable cause before the N.L.R.B. 
leaves a state court free to act in the premises. If the case 
does not fall within the jurisdictional 'yardstick' of the 
N.L.R.B., jurisdiction is impliedly ceded to the state court. 
When the N.LR.B. announces that it will refuse jur-
isdiction in certain types of cases, it states, by implication 
at least, that the resolution of those matters cannot beef-
fectually had by its processes. "If then the state courts do 
not 'take jurisdiction," as stated in the case of Ringling 
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., vs. Lew-
is, et al, New York Supreme Court, 135 N. Y. l. J. April 
10, 1956, p. 7 (30 labor Cases 69,887}, "an area of em-
ployer-employee relationship reverts to the unsupervised 
jungle where decisions go to the strong and ruthless." 
See also a 1955 California Supreme Court case squarely 
in point: J. S. Garmon et al vs. San Diego Building Trades 
Council 291 P. 2d 1. See generally the case of Lee Mark 
Metal Manufacturing Company vs. Local No. 596 lnter-
na'tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra, and cases cit-
ed therein. 
It is, therefore, submitted that neither under the pre-
emption doctrine nor under the interstate commerce doc-
rine, was the trial court in this case without jurisdiction to 
issue the injunction in this case, and to the contrary state 
jurisdiction was proper by reason either of (1} the exis-
tence of violence, threats, and other violation of local law 
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existing in this case, or (2) the refusal of the N.L.R.B. to 
assume jurisdiction because of its jurisdictional 'yardstick' 
doctrine. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE ITS 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION .HEREIN UNDER UTAH STAT-
UTES. 
As we understand defendants, they contend that the 
trial court also lacked iurisdiction to issue its injunction 
herein because of the provisions and limitations of the 
Utah Labor Disputes Act, Ti~'le 34, Ch. 1, UCA 1953, 
which is sometimes called the "Little Norris- LaGuardia 
Act." 
Our answer to this contention is two-fold: 
(1) The Utah Right to Work Law, Laws of Utah 1955, 
Ch. 54, Sec. 1, confers the power to issue injunctions 
in such cases and the Utah Labor Dispute Act, if repug-
nant .to this later expression of our legislature on that 
point, is repealed by implication. 
We believe this Court will not find it necessary to 
pass upon ·the constitutional question hereinafter stated 
because of the well established law governing the first 
portion of our answer now being set forth. The Utah 
Right to Work Law specially recognizes the right of the 
courts to issue injunctions in cases such as this one and 
while the U'tah Right to Work Law does not expressly ne-
gative the application of the Utah Labor Disputes Act, it 
is the latest expression of the legislature, and is control-
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ling as to injunctive relief under that law. If there is any 
conflict between the two acts, the Right to Work Law 
supercedes the conflidting portion of the so-called "Little 
Norris- LaGuardia Act." See the case of Hanson v. Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 406, 79 
So. 2d 199 (1955) involving the precise question and al-
most haec verba statutes as our two statutes above re-
ferred to: 
"Where two legislative acts are repugnant to, or 
in confi'lct with, each other the last one enacted 
will govern, control, or prevail, and supercede 
and impliedly repeal the earlier act although it 
contains no repealing clause." 
See also: 82 C.J.S. 489, Sec. 291, citing Bullen vs. Ander-
son, 81 Utah 151, 17 p. 2d 213, wherein it was held that 
provisions of la,ter statutes prevail over conflicting pro-
visions of an earlier statute. 
(2) The Utah Labor Disputes Act in so far as it pur-
ports to limit or restrict the power of courts to issue in-
junctions is clearly an invasion by the legislature of juris-
diction conferred by the Constitution of the State of Utah 
upon its courts of general jurisdiction and is therefore un-
constitutional. 
The provisions of the co-called "Little Norris-La-
Guardia Act," in so far as they seek to limit the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts of the State of Utah in the grant-
ing of relief by injuction, if that is necessary for the pro-
tection of rights and property, and to support the de-
clared public policy of the State of Utah as expressed in 
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its Right to Work Law, are illegal, ineffective and an un-
constiltutional assumption of power by the 'legis'lature, 
and an infringement upon the inherent right of the courts. 
Article V, Sec. 1, Constitution of Utah provides: 
"The powers of the governmen~t of the State of 
Utah shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Ju-
dicial; and no person charged with the exercise 
of the powers properly be'longing to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any function apper-
taining to either of the others, except in the cases 
herein expressly directed or permi:tted." 
Article VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution of Utah provides: 
"The Judicial power of the State shall be vested 
in the Senate sitHng as a court of impeachment, 
in a Supreme Court, in district cour'ts, in justices of 
the peace, and such other courts inferior to the 
Supreme Court as may be established by law." 
Article VIII, Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah provides: 
"The district courts or any judge thereof, shall 
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, man-
damus, injunction, quo warranto, cer,tiorari, pro-
hibition and other writs necessary to carry into 
effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and to 
give them a general control over inferior courifs 
and tribunals within their respective jurisdic-
tions." 
The framers of the Constitution expressly conferred 
upon the courts and reserved unto them the power to is-
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sue the writs mentioned in the Constitution, one of which 
writs is that of injunction. If :they had intended that the 
courts should have such power as may be prescribed by 
law, and to issue writs of injunction as may be defined 
by the legislature, they would have sa:.d so. See: State ex 
rei. Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 104 Poe. 760, 
where the Court said: 
" ... If it is within the power of the legisla-
ture to enlarge the office of the writ, it must also 
be within its power to abridge it. If such power 
to enlarge and abridge exists, then the power of 
courts to issue the writs, and the cases to which 
they may apply, are wholly dependent upon the 
wil'l and discretion of the legislature. In such 
cases the power of courts to issue the writs is as 
by statute provided, and not as provided by the 
Constitution. . . . " 
And .the Court held that the legislature could not break 
in upon the Constitution or encroach upon the preroga-
tive of courts, and that its enactment extending and en-
larging the office of the writ of prohibition was void. 
The power conferred upon the courts by the Constitution 
cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legislature. 
See Blanchard vs. Golden Age Brewing Company 
(Washington, 1936) 63 P. (2d) 397 holding under consti-
tutional provisions practically identical with ours and la-
bor Disputes Act also practically identical with ours that 
the latter was unconstitutional in so far as it purpor'ted to 
limit or restrict the powers of the court of equity to issue 
injunctions in labor disputes: 
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"Thus, by constitution and independently of any 
legislative enactment, the judicial power over 
cases in equity has been vested in fhe courts, and, 
in 1the absence of any constitutional provisions to 
the contrary, such power may not be abrogated 
or restricted by the legislative department" page 
405. 
The rationale back of this line of authorities is 
brought in sharp relief when one considers the federal 
judicial structure. In the federal field the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act (1932) provided that: 
"No court of the United States, as herein defined, 
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining or-
der or temporary injunction in a case invo'lving or 
growing out of a labor dispute except in strict 
conformity with the provisions of such sections." 
29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 101. 
But Section 113 {d) of that Act defines court of the United 
States as: 
"The term 'court of the United States' means any 
court of the United States whose iurisdiction has 
been or may be conferred or defined or limited 
by Act of Congress." 
It is clear, as Mr. Justice Stone sta,ted in Lockerty vs. 
Phillips 319 U.S. 238,63 S. Ct. 1019, "The congressional 
power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the 
power of investing them with jurisdiction ei,ther limited, 
concurrent or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction 
from them in the exact degrees and character which to 
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Congress may seem proper for the public good." 
The only Cour~t created by our United States Consti-
tution is the Supreme Court itself. All other courts in-
cluding U. S. District and Circuit Courts of Appeal are es·· 
tablished by Congressional Act. 
The District Courts of the State of Utah, unlike in-
ferior Uni'ted States courts, obtained their power to issue 
Injunctions from the constitution. The legislature may not 
restrict that power. 
Defendants further contend the injunction issued in 
this case was too sweeping in its terms. The trial court in 
the instant case found that no picket line could be main-
tained in view of what had happened without its 
having the advantage of a coercive influence, and that 
the permanent injunction granted was restricted to the 
situation as i·t exists, with the plaintiffs operating their 
mine under the arrangement that it is now being operat-
ed under (398). Such finding by the trial court, and its 
granting of a permanent injunction, is the same realis-
tic appraisal as that of the court in the case of Morris vs. 
Local Union No. 494 of Amalgamated Meat Cutters and 
Butchers Workmen of Spokane et al, 234 P. 2d 543 
(Wash. 1951). To accept the defendants claim that the 
reason for picketing the plaintiffs' coal mine was that 
the picket line contributed to the free enterchange of 
thought and communication of ideas and factual infor-
mation, and that it was not to coerce the plaintiffs into 
signing a 'take it or leave it' contract offered by the un-
ion (116), and to deprive them of the liberty of lawfully 
conducting their business in the only manner that1 in 
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their judgmen~t {129), it could be profitably conducted, 
would be to put reality aside. Peaceful picketing, which 
the facts in the instant case belie, for an unlawful pur-
pose, that is, in contravention of the "right to work" pol-
icy of the State, as in this case, can be legally enjoined. 
Hanson v. International Union of OperatingEngineers 
Local No. 406, supra, (1955); Woodard et al vs. Collier 
et al, 78 S. E. 2d 526 (1953). 
Point Ill 
THE PICKETING HEREIN WAS NOT PEACEFUL, AND 
WAS FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE. 
The contention of defendants is that the trial court 
disregarded all of the evidence of the defendants and 
gave credence to the plaintiffs' testimony in toto. Afford-
ed the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the wit-
nesses, and occupying the advantageous position of de-
termining their credibility and the weight to be given to 
their testimony, the trial court found threats in wha't the 
pickets said when they stopped certain of the p'laintiffs 
and an independent trucker. The evidence amply and 
clearly preponderates in support of that finding. 
Plaintiffs submit that men, in the normal course of 
their lives, react to current situations in the light of their 
past experience and accumulated knowledge. In a real-
istic approach to the subject of picketing, the individual 
reactions of those picketed, or those indirectly affected 
by the picketing, cannot be divorced from their past ex-
perience. As stated in the dissenting opinion in State vs. 
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Washington ex rei Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Sup-
erior Court, 164, P. 2d 662 (1945), cited by the defen-
dants, picketing, whether peaceful or otherwise, is noth-
ing less than economic pressure, economic coercion, or 
economic warfare, whichever of those terms may be the 
most suitable to the particular occasion, and members of 
the public endeavor to keep as far away from it as pos-
sible in order to avoid embarrassing situations. The re-
actions of the witnesses in this case to the statements 
made by the pickets, were entirely normal under the cir-
cumstances and fully justified, and the trial court so 
found (300). 
From all of the evidence introduced, the court could 
well find, as it did (397), that the picketing of plaintiffs' 
mine was enmeshed in violence - the blowing up of a 
bridge and the scattering of nails, and the shooting of 
cars. Defendants complain of the admission by the trial 
court (391) of the evidence offered by plaintiffs of the 
shooting of trucks by the defendant Faye Olsen (308). The 
record disCloses (309) t'hat the trial court was fully ad-
vised that it was a matter within its sound discretion to 
determine whether the incident was so closely related, 
by virtue of the time or the act done, as to be admissable, 
and was cited 31 C. J. S. 872-73, Sec. 162: 
"Evidence of facts which happened before or 
after the transaction in issue, but which relate 
directly to it, may be admissable, as where they 
were, or probably may have been, the cause or 
effect of a fact in issue." 
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But aside from the above considerations as to 
whether or not the picketing in the instan.t case was 
peaceful or otherwise, it was not for a lawful purpose 
and could therefore be enjoined. 
The picketing of plaintiffs' mine was illegal conduct 
contrary to the declared public policy of the State of Utah 
as expressed in the Utah Right to Work Law, Laws of 
Utah 1955, Ch. 54, Sec. 1, (34-16-2 U.C.'A. 1953): 
"Public policy.-lt is hereby declared to be the 
public policy of the state of Utah that the right 
of persons to work, whether in private employ-
ment or for the s~tate of Utah, its counties, cities, 
school districts, or other political subdivisions, 
shall not be denied or abridged on account of 
membership or nonmembership in any labor 
union, labor organization or any other type of 
association; further, that the right to live includes 
the right to work. The exercise of the right to 
work must be protected and maintained free from 
undue restrain·ts and coercion." 
In Building Service Employees International Union, Local 
262, vs. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, the court said: 
"The public policy of any state is to be found in 
its constitution, acts of the legislature, and deci-
sions of its courts. Primarily it is for the law mak-
ers to determine the public policy of the State." 
and it was held that a state is permitted to enjoin peace-
ful picketing which is in violation of the state's public pol-
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
icy. And to the same effect see Marcus Heath et al vs. 
Motion Picture Machine Operators Union No. 170, 290 
S. W. 2d 152 {1956); and Hanson v. International Union 
of Operating Engineers Local No. 406, supra, (1955). 
See also Local Union No. 10 et al v. Graham et al, 
345 U. S. 192, 73 S. Ct. 585 {March 16, 1953) wherein 
the Court stated "The basic question here is whether the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, consistently with the Consti-
tution of the United States, may enjoin peaceful picket-
ing when it is carried on for purposes in confilct with the 
Virginia Right to Work Statute." The Court answered 
this question in fhe affirmative. 
POINT IV 
NOT ALL PEACEFUL PICKETING IS THE LEGITIMATE 
EXERCI'SE OF FREE SPEECH, AND PEACEFUL PICKETING 
TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS, WHO OPERATE WITHOUT OUT-
SIDE HElP, TO JOIN UNION WAS ILLEGAL, CONTRARY 
TO PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND COULD 
BE ENJOINED. 
One of the cases cited by defendants, in the light of 
the development of the law as related to the assimilation 
of picketing to the right of free speech, is almost prophet-
ic. Se: International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 
No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 115 Utah 183, 203 
P. 2d 404, wherein this Court said: 
"It may be noted here that none of the constitu-
tional guarantees embodied in the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution of the United 
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And, 
And, 
And, 
States are absolute rights. All of them are sub-
ject to some regulation by the state. To consider 
them as absolutes would be, in effect, to deny to 
the states any police power. 
"Like the other fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Bill of Rights, the right of free speech is, and 
always has been, subject to reasonable regula-
tion by the state when it collides with more para-
mount public interest." 
"It must be recognized that picketing, as an ex-
ercise of the right of free speech, is subject to po-
lice regulation by the state. We are aware of no 
decision, either of the Supreme Cour:t of the Unit-
ed States, or of any state court, which has either 
he'ld or inferred to t'he contrary. In fact in nearly 
every opinion treating the subject which has come 
to our attention, the cour:t has specifically pointed 
out the right of the state to regulate picketing." 
"The cases in the Supreme Court of the United 
States in regard to t'he relation of picketing to free 
speech under varying situations, if not in unstable 
equilibrium, are not completely stabilized, and 
necessarily so because in this field of the law, 
labor's right on the one hand to communicate in-
formation or persuade through picket line tech-
nique, and on the other hand the rights of the 
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employer or of the public are in delicate balance, 
if not in opposition. The law may be pronounced 
only according to various factual situations as 
they are presented on review." 
This Court clearly took a very cautious position that would 
enable it to conform to the growth of the law upon this 
novel concept of the right of free speech as related to 
picketing. The growth of the law during the past six years 
has eminently justified this Court's considered restraint. 
What has been most descriptively designated as "The 
Shriveling of the Doctrine" of free speech has devoleped. 
See: Labor Relations and the Law, (little Brown & Co., 
Boston, 1953) page 756. Picketing is no longer consider-
ed as purely free speech, but as a distinct entity, and al-
.though one of its elements is recognized as communica-
tion, this element is but one of many to be considered. 
See: Utah Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, page 98, (1956) 
uPeaceful Picketing and Free Speech in State Courts: 
1949-56." 
In Hanke et al v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 
309, et al, 207 P.2d 206, (Wash. 1949), the Court found 
that there was little, if any, dispute in the evidence. The 
respondents and his three sons were operating a co-part-
nership business in the city of Seattle, under the firm name 
of Atlas Auto Rebuild. They had no employees in the op-
eration of any part of their business, but themselves alone 
did all the work and labor connected therewith. A system 
of peaceful picketing of the respondents' place of busi-
ness was instituted by the Union in order to compel the 
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respondents to confine themselves to shorter hours of 
business and limited periods as demanded by the Union. 
The conr·tolling question, as stated by the Supreme Court 
of Washington was: whether or not, under the facts of the 
case, the granting of injunctive relief by the tria'l court 
against the appellant union and its representatives violat-
ed the provision of the Federal constitution forbidding the 
abridgement of freedom of speech. The Supreme Court of 
Washington found that the purpose of the picketing was 
to indirectly compel the respondents to become members 
of the Union, and directly to coerce fhe respondents to en-
ter into an agreement under which they would carry on 
their business only during those hours and days arbitrar-
ily fixed by fhe Union. The Court found and declared that 
the picketing activity conducted by the Union constituted 
coercion and was therefore unlawful. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Washington 
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in lnte·r-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, ChauHeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers Union, Local 309, ~t al., v. A. E. 
Hanke et al, May 8, 1950, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773, 13 
ALR2d 631. Many of the authorities relied upon by de-
fendants in their brief in the instant case were distinguish-
ed, and the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, said: 
"* * * we must start with the fact that while 
picketing has an ingredient of communication it 
cannot dogmatically be equated with the consti-
tutionally protected freedom of speech. Our de-
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cisions reflect recognition that picketing is indeed 
a hybrid!'. Freund, On Understanding the Su-
preme Court 18 (1949). See also Jaffe, In Defense 
of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 
Mich L Rev 1 037 (1943). The effort in the cases has 
been to strike a balance between the constitution-
al protection of the element of communicaion in 
picketing and the 'power of the State to set the 
limits of permissable contest open to industrial 
combatants.' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88, 
104, 84 L. ed 1093, 1103, 60 S.Ct. 736. A State's 
judgment on striking such a balance is of course 
subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amend 
ment. Embracing as such a judgment does, how-
ever, a State's social and economic policies, which 
in turn depend on knowledge and appraisal of 
local social and economic factors, such judgment 
on these matters comes to this Court bearing a 
weighty title of respect. 
"These two cases emphasize the nature of a prob-
lem that is presented by our duty of sitting in 
judgment on a State's judgment in striking the 
balance that has to be struck when a State decides 
not 'to keep hands off these industrial contests. 
Here we have a glaring instance of the interplay 
of competing social-economic interests and view-
points. Unions obviously are concerned not to 
have union standards undermined by non-union 
shops. This interest penetrates into self-employer 
shops. On the other hand, some of our profound-
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est thinkers from Jefferson to Brandeis have stress-
ed the impor.tance to a democratic society of en-
couraging self-employer economic units as a 
counter-movement to what are deemed to be the 
dangers inherent in excessive concentration of ec-
onomic power. 'There is a widespread belief ... , 
that the true prosperity of our past came not from 
big business, but through the courage, the energy 
and the ~esourcefulness of small men; ... ; andi 
that only through participation by the many in 
the responsibilities and de:terminations of busi-
ness, can Americans secure the moral and intel-
lectual deve'lopment which is essential to the 
maintenance of liber:ty.' 
"* * * when one considers that issues not un-
like those that are here have been simi11arly view-
ed by other States and by the Congress of the 
United States, we cannot conclude that Washing-
ton, in holding the picketing in these cases to be 
for an unlawful object, has struck a balance so 
inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people 
that it must be found an unconstitutional choice. 
Mindful as we are that a phase of picketing is 
communication, we cannot find that Washington 
has offended the Constitution. 
In Morris v. Local Union No. 494 of Amalgamated 
Meet Cutters and Butcher Workmen of Spokane et al, 
supra (Wash. 1951 ), it was held that picketing which was 
coercive and intended to force either a self-employer or 
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his wife to join a union, and to force the employer to com-
pel any employees to join the union, regardless of their 
personal desires, would be enjoined as contrary to the 
public policy of the state. The court said: 
"To claim as the reason for picketing Morris's 
business establishment that the picket line con-
tributed to the free interchange of thought and 
communication of ideas and factual information 
in the city of Spokane, and t'hat it was not to co-
erce Morris into signing the 'take it or leave it' 
contract offered by the union, is to put reality 
aside. That contract, as the trial court found, 
would compel Morris or his wife to join the union, 
and would require Morris to compel his employ-
ees, if any, to join the union." 
In Torr v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street Electric Ry. 
& Motor Coach Employees of America, Division 1055 et al, 
supra, the plaintiff purchased certain equipment and leas-
ed other facilities from a transit company and commenced 
operations on his own responsibility on a permit from the 
city. The plaintiff had been the business manager of the 
transit company, and had participated in the negotiations 
over the dispute between the company and the defendant 
union. The plaintiff had entered into a conditional sales 
contract with the transit company wherein he purchased 
the motor vehicles of the company; paid nothing down 
but agreed to pay $600.00 per month. The defendant un-
ion picketed the plaintiff, who secured an injunction. The 
defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court of Idaho in 
affirming the injunction said: 
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"There being no labor dispute and the picketing 
being unlawful, the acts of the defendants were 
not protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States, and 
the court was not restricted by the constitution or 
otherwise in the issuing of an injunotion and has 
jurisdiction so to do." 
SeeWoodard et al v. Collier et al, 78 S.E. 2d 526 (1953). 
In Hanson v. International Union of Operating Engineers 
Local No. 406, supra, (1953), it was held that peaceful 
picketing for an unlawful purpose, that is, in contraven-
tion of the "right to work" policy of the State, cou'ld be 
legally enjoined. 
In Building Service Employees International Union, 
Local 262, v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, the court said: 
"This Court has said that picke'ting is an exercise 
of the right of free speech guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution. * * * But since picketing is 
more than speech and establishes a locus in quo 
that has far more poten,tia'l for inducing action or 
nonaction than the message the pickets convey, 
this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state's 
restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse 
of the right to picket rather than a means of 
peaceful and truthful publicity. * * *." 
In Marcus Heath et al v. Motion Picture Machine Op-
erators Union No. 170, supra, (1956), it was held that to 
induce the co-owner of a theatre to cease operating a 
projection machine and to hire a union member in his 
·place was against state public policy and was properly 
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enjoined, since the co-owner, who was ineligible for un-
ion membership, was entitled to 'the same immunity as 
would have to be accorded a one-man business in which 
the businessman-proprietor performed all his work with-
out the assistance of employees. 
The defendants construe the words "peaceful per-
suasion" as synonomous with "peaceful picketing". The 
au,thorities above cited cannot be harmonized with such 
contention, for it is recognized that even peaceful picket-
ing, while it has ingredients of communication, is a form 
of economic coercion having far more potential than mere 
speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Without repeating the specific points above enum-
erated and argued, we submit that both the law and the 
facts in this case amply support the decision of the able 
and discerning trial judge. 
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S. J. SWEETRING 
A ttomey far Respondents 
Silvagni Building 
Price, Utah 
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